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Abstract If uncertainty is modelled by a probability measure, decisions are typ-
ically made by choosing the option with the highest expected utility. If an im-
precise probability model is used instead, this decision rule can be generalised
in several ways. We here focus on two such generalisations that apply to sets
of probability measures: E-admissibility and maximality. Both of them can be
regarded as special instances of so-called choice functions, a very general math-
ematical framework for decision making. For each of these two decision rules,
we provide a set of necessary and sufficient conditions on choice functions that
uniquely characterises this rule, thereby providing an axiomatic foundation for
imprecise decision making with sets of probabilities. A representation theorem
for Archimedean choice functions in terms of coherent lower previsions lies at
the basis of both results.
Keywords: E-admissibility · Maximality · Archimedean choice functions · De-
cision Making · Imprecise probabilities.
1 Introduction
Decision making under uncertainty is typically carried out by combining an uncertainty
model with a decision rule. If uncertainty is modelled by a probability measure, the by
far most popular such decision rule is maximising expected utility, where one chooses
the option—or makes the decision—whose expected utility with respect to this probab-
ility measure is the highest.
Uncertainty can also be modelled in various other ways though. The theory of im-
precise probabilities, for example, offers a wide range of extensions of probability the-
ory that provide more flexible modelling possibilities, such as differentiating between
stochastic uncertainty and model uncertainty. The most straightforward such extension
is to consider a set of probability measures instead of a single one, but one can also
use interval probabilities, coherent lower previsions, sets of desirable gambles, belief
functions, to name only a few.
For all these different types of uncertainty models, various decision rules have been
developed,making the total number of possible combinations rather daunting. Choosing
which combination of uncertainty model and decision rule to use is therefore difficult
and often dealt with in a pragmatic fashion, by using a combination that one is familiar
with, that is convenient or that is computationaly advantageous.
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To motivate the use of a specific combination in a more principled way, one can also
consider its properties. That is, one can aim to select an uncertainty model and decision
rule whose resulting decisions satisfy the properties that one finds desirable for the
decision problem at hand. In some cases, imposing a given set of properties as axioms
can even rule out all combinations but one, thereby providing an axiomatic foundation
for the use of a specific type of uncertainty model and decision rule. The famous work
of Savage [8], for example, provides an axiomatic foundation for maximising expected
utility with respect to a probability measure.
The main contributions of this paper are axiomatic foundations for three specific
decision rules that make use of imprecise probability models [10]. The first two de-
cision rules, called E-admissibility [6] and maximality [12], apply to a set of probab-
ility measures; they both reduce to maximising expected utility when this set contains
only a single probability measure, but are otherwise fundamentally different. The third
decision rule applies to sets of coherent lower previsions; it is more abstract then the
other two, but includes both of them as special cases. This allows us to use our ax-
iomatic foundation for the third rule as an intermediate step towards axiomatising E-
admissibility and maximality.
To obtain our results, we make extensive use of choice functions [9,11,3]: a unifying
framework for studying decision making. These choice functions require no reference
to an uncertainty model or a decision rule, but are simply concerned with the decisions
themselves, making them an excellent tool for comparing different methods. We will
be especially interested in Archimedean choice functions, because all of the decision
schemes that we consider are of this particular type.
2 Choice Functions and Uncertainty Models
A choice function C, quite simply, is a function that chooses. Specifically, for every
finite set A of options, it returns a subset C(A) of A. We here consider the special case
where options are gambles: bounded real functions on some fixed state space X . We
let L be the set of all gambles onX and we useQ to denote the set of all finite subsets
of L , including the empty set. A choice function C is then a map from Q to Q such
that, for all A ∈Q, C(A)⊆ A.
IfC(A) contains only a single option u, this means that u is chosen from A. IfC(A)
consists of multiple options, several interpretations can be adopted. On the one hand,
this can be taken to mean that each of the options inC(A) is chosen. On the other hand,
C(A) can also be regarded as a set of options among which it is not feasible to choose, in
the sense that they are incomparable based on the available information; in other words:
the elements of A \C(A) are rejected, but those in C(A) are not necessarily ‘chosen’.
While our mathematical results further on do not require a philosophical stance in this
matter, it will become apparent from our examples and interpretation that we have the
later approach in mind.
A very popular class of choice functions—while not necessarily always called as
such—are those that correspond to maximising expected utility. The idea there is to
consider a probability measure P and to let C(A) be the element(s) of A whose expec-
ted value—or utility—is highest. The probability measure in question is often taken to
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be countably additive, but we will not impose this restriction here, and impose only
finite additivity. These finitely additive probability measures are uniquely characterised
by their corresponding expectation operators, which are linear real functionals on L
that dominate the infinum operator. We follow de Finetti in denoting these expectation
operators by P as well, and in calling them linear previsions [5,12].
Definition 1. A linear prevision P on L is a map from L to R that satisfies
P1. P(u )≥ infu for all u ∈L ; boundedness
P2. P(λu) = λP(u) for all real λ and u ∈L ; homogeneity
P3. P(u+ v) = P(u)+P(v) for all u,v ∈L . additivity
We denote the set of all linear previsions on L by P.
For any such linear prevision—or equivalently, any finitely additive probability
measure—the choice function obtained by maximising expected utility is defined by
CP(A) :=
{
u ∈ A : (∀v ∈ A \ {u}) P(u)≥ P(v)
}
for all A ∈Q. (1)
It returns the options u in A that have the highest prevision—or expectation—P(u).
However, there are also many situations in which it is not feasible to represent un-
certainty by a single prevision or probabilitymeasure [12, Section 1.4.4]. In those cases,
imprecise probabilitymodels can be used instead. Themost straightforward such impre-
cise approach is to consider a non-empty setP ⊆ P of linear previsions—or probability
measures—as uncertainty model, the elements of which can be regarded as candidates
for some ‘true’ but unknown precise model.
In that context, maximising expected utility can be generalised in several ways [10],
of which we here consider two. The first is called E-admissibility; it chooses those
options that maximise expected utility with respect to at least one precise model in P:
CEP(A) :=
{
u ∈ A : (∃P∈P)(∀v ∈ A \ {u}) P(u)≥ P(v)
}
for all A ∈Q. (2)
The second generalisation is called maximality and starts from a partial order on the
elements of A. In particular, for any two options u,v ∈ A, the option u is deemed better
than v if its expectation is higher for every P∈P . Decision making with maximality
then consists in choosing the options u in A that are undominated in this order, in the
sense that no other option v ∈ A is better than u:
CMP(A) :=
{
u ∈ A : (∀v ∈ A \ {u})(∃P∈P) P(u)≥ P(v)
}
for all A ∈Q. (3)
One can easily verify thatCE
P
(A)⊆CM
P
(A), making maximality the most conservative
decisions rule of the two. Furthermore, in the particular case where P contains only a
single linear prevision, they clearly coincide and both reduce to maximising expected
utility. In all other cases, however, maximality and E-admissibility are different; see for
example Proposition 3 in Section 9 for a formal statement.
One of the main aims of this paper is to characterise each of these two types of
choice functions in terms of their properties. That is, we are looking for necessary and
sufficient conditions under which a general choice functionC is of the formCE
P
orCM
P
,
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without assuming a priori the existence of a set of linear previsionsP . Such conditions
will be presented in Section 7 and 8, respectively.
A crucial intermediate step in obtaining these two results will consist in finding
a similar characterisation for choice functions that correspond to (sets of) coherent
lower previsions [12], a generalisation of linear previsions that replaces additivity by
the weaker property of superadditivity.
Definition 2. A coherent lower prevision P on L is a map from L to R that satisfies
LP1. P(u)≥ infu for all u ∈L ; boundedness
LP2. P(λu) = λP(u) for all real λ > 0 and u ∈L ; positive homogeneity
LP3. P(u+ v)≥ P(u)+P(v) for all u,v ∈L . superadditivity
We denote the set of all coherent lower previsions on L by P.
That linear previsions are a special case of coherent lower previsions follows trivi-
ally from their definitions. There is however also a more profound connection between
both concepts: coherent lower previsions are minima of linear ones.
Theorem 1. [12, Section 3.3.3.] A real-valued map P on L is a coherent lower previ-
sion if and only if there is a non-empty set P ⊆ P of linear previsions such that
P(u) =min{P(u) : P∈P} for all u ∈L .
Alternatively, coherent lower previsions can also be given a direct behavioural inter-
pretation in terms of gambling, without any reference to probability measures or linear
previsions [12,13].
Regardless of their interpretation, with any given non-empty set P ⊆ P of these
coherent lower previsions, we can associate a choice functionCP in the following way:
CP (A) :=
{
u ∈ A : (∃P ∈P)(∀v ∈ A \ {u}) P(v− u)≤ 0
}
for all A ∈Q. (4)
If the lower previsions in P are all linear, this definition reduces to E-admissibility, as
can be seen by comparing Equations (2) and (4). What is far less obvious though, is
that maximality is also a special case of Equation (4); see Theorem 7 in Section 8 for a
formal statement. In that case, the sets P in Equations (4) and (3) may of course—and
typically will—be different.
Because the choice functions that correspond to E-admissibility and maximality are
both of the form CP , with P a set of coherent lower previsions, any attempt at char-
acterising the former will of course benefit from characterising the latter. A large part
of this paper will therefore be devoted to the development of necessary and sufficient
conditions for a general choice functionC to be of the formCP . In order to obtain such
conditions, we will interpret choice functions in terms of (strict) desirability and estab-
lish a connection with so-called sets of desirable option sets. This interpretation will
lead to a natural set of conditions that, as we will eventually see in Section 6, uniquely
characterises choice functions of the form CP . We start with a brief introduction to
desirability and sets of desirable option sets.
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3 Coherent Sets of Desirable Option Sets
The basic notion on which our interpretation for choice functions will be based, and
from which our axiomatisation will eventually be derived, is that of a desirable op-
tion: an option that is strictly preferred over the status quo [1,7,12]. In our case, where
options are gambles u ∈ L on X and the status quo is the zero gamble, this means
that the uncertain—and possibly negative—reward u(x), whose actual value depends
on the uncertain state x ∈X , is strictly preferred over the zero reward. In other words:
gambling according to u is strictly preferred over not gambling at all.
We will impose the following three principles on desirable options, where we use
‘(λ ,µ) > 0’ as a shorthand notation for ‘λ ≥ 0, µ ≥ 0 and λ + µ > 0’. The first two
principles follow readily from the meaning of desirability. The third one follows from
an assumption that rewards are expressed in a linear utility scale.
d1. 0 is not desirable;
d2. if infu > 0, then u is desirable;
1
d3. if u,v are desirable and (λ ,µ)> 0, then λu+ µv is desirable.
The notion of a desirable option gives rise to two different frameworks for modelling
a subject’s uncertainty about the value x∈X . The first, which is well established, is that
of sets of desirable options—or sets of desirable gambles. The idea there is to consider
a set D that consists of options that are deemed desirable by a subject. If such a set is
compatible with the principles d1–d3, it is called coherent.
Definition 3. A set of desirable options D ∈ D is coherent if it satisfies:
D1. 0 /∈ D;
D2. if infu > 0, then u ∈ D;
D3. if u,v ∈ D and (λ ,µ)> 0, then λu+ µv ∈ D.
We denote the set of all coherent sets of desirable options by D.
Amore general framework, which will serve as our main workhorse in this paper, is
that of sets of desirable option sets [2]. The idea here is to consider a set K of so-called
desirable option sets A, which are finite sets of options that, according to our subject,
are deemed to contain at least one desirable option. To say that A = {u,v} is a desirable
option set, for example, means that u or v is desirable. Crucially, the framework of
sets of desirable option sets allows a subject to make this statement without having to
specify—or know—which of the two options u or v is desirable. As explained in earlier
work [3, Section 3],2 it follows from d1–d3 that any set of desirable option sets K should
satisfy the following axioms. If it does, we call K coherent.
1 There is no consensus on which properties to impose on desirability; the main ideas and results
are always very similar though [1,7,12,13]. In particular, d2 is often strengthened by requiring
that u is desirable as soon as infu ≥ 0 and u 6= 0; we here prefer d2 because it is less stringent
and because it combines more easily with the notion of strict desirability that we will consider
in Section 5. Annalogous comments apply to D2 and K2 further on.
2 Reference [3] deals with the more general case where options take values in an abstract vector
space V , and where d2 imposes that u should be desirable if u ≻ 0, with ≻ an arbitrary but
fixed strict vector ordering. Whenever we invoke results from [3], we are applying them for
the special case where V = L and u ≻ v⇔ inf(u−v)> 0.
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Definition 4. A set of desirable option sets K ⊆Q is coherent if it satisfies:
K0. if A ∈ K then also A \ {0} ∈ K, for all A ∈Q;
K1. {0} /∈ K;
K2. {u} ∈ K for all u ∈L with infu > 0;
K3. if A1,A2 ∈ K and if, for all u ∈ A1 and v ∈ A2, (λu,v ,µu,v)> 0, then also
{λu,vu+ µu,vv : u ∈ A1,v ∈ A2} ∈ K;
K4. if A1 ∈ K and A1 ⊆ A2, then also A2 ∈ K, for all A1,A2 ∈Q.
We denote the set of all coherent sets of desirable option sets by K.
One particular way of obtaining a set of desirable option sets, is to derive it from a
set of desirable options D, as follows:
KD := {A ∈Q : A∩D 6= /0}. (5)
One can easily verify that if D is coherent, then KD will be as well [3, Proposition 8]. In
general, however, sets of desirable option sets are more expressive than sets of desirable
options. The link between both is provided by Theorem 2, which shows that a set of
desirable option sets can be equivalently represented by a set of sets of desirable options.
Theorem 2. [3, Theorem 9] A set of desirable option sets K is coherent if and only if
there is some non-empty set D ⊆ D such that K =
⋂
{KD : D ∈D}.
In practice, modelling a subject’s uncertainty does not require her to specify a full
coherent set of desirable option sets though. Instead, it suffices for her to provide an
assessment A ⊆Q, consisting of option sets A that she considers desirable. If such an
assessment is consistent with coherence, meaning that there is at least one coherent set
of desirable option sets K that includes A , then this assessment can always be extended
to a unique smallest—most conservative—coherent set of desirable option sets, called
the natural extension of A . This natural extension is given by
Ex(A ) :=
⋂{
K ∈K : A ⊆ K
}
=
⋂{
KD : D ∈ D,A ⊆ KD
}
, (6)
as follows readily from Theorem 2. If A is not consistent with coherence, Ex(A ) is an
empty intersection, which, by convention, we set equal to Q.
4 Strongly Archimedean Sets of Desirable Option Sets
That sets of desirable option sets can be used to axiomatise choice functions of the type
CP , with P a set of coherent lower previsions, was already demonstrated in earlier
work [3] for the specific case whereP is closed with respect to pointwise convergence.
A key step in that result consisted in strengthening the interpretation of K, replacing
desirability with the stronger notion of strict desirability [12, Section 3.7.7]. We here
repeat the reasoning that led to this result, before adapting it in Section 5 to get rid of
the closure condition.
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We call a desirable option u strictly desirable if there is some real ε > 0 such that
u− ε is desirable.3 As a simple consequence of this definition and d1–d3, we find that
sd1. 0 is not strictly desirable;
sd2. if infu > 0, then u is strictly desirable;
sd3. if u,v are strictly desirable and (λ ,µ)> 0, then λu+ µv is strictly desirable;
sd4. if u is strictly desirable, then u− ε is strictly desirable for some real ε > 0.
By applying these principles to sets of desirable options, we arrive at the concept of a
coherent set of strictly desirable options: a coherent set of desirable options D that is
compatible with sd4. What is particularly interesting about such sets is that they are in
one-to-one correspondence with coherent lower previsions [3,12], thereby allowing us
to move from desirability to lower previsions as a first step towards choice functions
of the formCP . The problem with coherent sets of strictly desirable options, however,
is that they correspond to a single lower prevision P, while we which to consider a set
P of them. To achieve this, we again consider sets of desirable option sets, but now
suitably adapted to strict desirability.
So consider any set of desirable option sets K and let us interpret it in terms of
strict desirability. That A belongs to K then means that A contains at least one strictly
desirable option. Given this interpretation, what properties should K satisfy? Since the
principles sd1–sd3 are identical to d1–d3, K should clearly be coherent, meaning that it
should satisfy K0–K4. Formalising the implications of sd4 is more tricky though, as it
can be done in several ways.
The first and most straighforward approach is to impose the following immediate
translation of sd4 to desirable option sets, where for all A ∈Q and real ε:
A− ε := {u− ε : u ∈ A}
Definition 5. A set of desirable option sets K is strongly Archimedean4 if it is coherent
and satisfies the following property:
KSA. if A ∈ K, then also A− ε ∈ K for some real ε > 0.
The reasoning behind this axiom goes as follows. Since A ∈ K is taken to mean that
there is at least one u ∈ A that is strictly desirable, it follows from sd4 that there is some
real ε > 0 such that u− ε is strictly desirable. This implies that A− ε contains at least
one strictly desirable option. It therefore seems sensible to impose that A− ε ∈ K.
To explain the implications of this axiom, and how it is related to lower previsions,
we need a way to link the latter to sets of desirable option sets. The first step is to
associate, with any coherent lower prevision P ∈ P, a set of desirable option sets
KP := {A ∈Q : (∃u ∈ A)P(u )> 0}. (7)
3 Walley’s original notion of strict desirability [12, Section 3.7.7] is slightly different. In his ver-
sion, if infu = 0 (but u 6= 0) then u should also be strictly desirable (but need not satisfy sd4).
4 In earlier work [3], we have referred to this property as Archimedeanity. With hindsight, how-
ever, we now prefer to reserve this terminology for the property in Definition 6.
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The coherence of this set can be easily verified [3, Propositions 8 and 24]. More gen-
erally, with any non-empty set P of coherent lower previsions, we associate a set of
desirable option sets
KP :=
⋂
{KP : P ∈P}. (8)
Coherence is again easily verified; it follows directly from the coherence of KP and the
fact that coherence is preserved under taking intersections. The final tool that we need
to explain the implications of strong Archimedeanity, does the opposite; it starts with a
coherent set of desirable option sets K, and associates a set of coherent lower previsions
with it, defined by
P(K) := {P ∈ P : K ⊆ KP}.
If K is strongly Archimedean, then as the following result shows, P(K) serves as a
mathematically equivalent representation for K, from wich K can be recovered through
Equation (8). The representing set P(K) will then furthermore be closed with respect to
the topology induced by pointwise convergence.
Theorem 3. [3, Theorem 28 and Proposition 24] A set of desirable option sets K is
strongly Archimedean if and only if there is some non-empty closed set P ⊆ P of co-
herent lower previsions such that K = KP . Closure is with respect to pointwise conver-
gence, and the largest such set P is then P(K).
If the representing coherent lower previsions in P or P(K) were linear, this result
would already brings us very close to decision rules based on sets of linear previsions—
or sets of probability measures. As we will see further on in Section 7, this can be
achieved by imposing an additional axiom called mixingness. Before we do so, how-
ever, we will do away with the closure condition in Theorem 3, as it is overly restrictive.
Imagine for example that we are modelling a subject’s uncertainty about the outcome of
a coin toss, and that she beliefs the coin to be unfair. In terms of probabilities, this would
mean that her probability for heads is different from one half. Strong Archimeanity is
not compatible with such an assessment, as the set of probability measures that satisfy
this (strict) probability constraint is not closed. Our first main contribution will consist
in resolving this issue, by suitably modifying the notion of strong Archimedeanity.
5 Archimedean Sets of Desirable Option Sets
At first sight, it may seem as if KSA is the only way in which sd4 can be translated to
option sets. There is however also a second, far more subtle approach.
The crucial insight on which this second approach is based is that our interpreta-
tion in terms of strict desirability does not require ε to be known; it only imposes the
existence of such an ε . Consider a subject whose uncertainty is represented by a set of
desirable option sets K and let us adopt an interpretation in terms of strict desirability.
This implies that the option sets A ∈ K are option sets that, according to her beliefs,
contain at least one strictly desirable option u ∈ A. As a consequence of sd4, this im-
plies that she beliefs that there is some real ε > 0 such that u− ε is strictly desirable.
Hence, she believes that there is some real ε > 0 such that A− ε contains at least one
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strictly desirable option. Strong Archimedeanity, at that point, concludes that A−ε ∈K.
However, this is only justified if our subject knows ε . If she doesn’t know ε , but only
believes that there is such an ε , then there is no single ε > 0 for which she believes that
A− ε contains at least one strictly desirable option. Since the option sets in K are op-
tions sets for which our subject believes that they contain at least one strictly desirable
option, it follows that A ∈ K need not necessarily imply that A− ε ∈ K for some ε > 0.
Strong Archimedeanity is therefore indeed, as its name suggests, a bit too strong for our
purposes.
So if we can’t infer that A− ε ∈ K, what is it then that we can infer from A ∈ K
and sd4? As explained above, the only thing that can be inferred is that for any A ∈ K,
there is some ε > 0 such that A−ε contains at least one strictly desirable option. Let us
denote this specific epsilon by ε(A). Crucially, we may not know—or rather, our subject
may not know—the specific value of ε(A). Nevertheless, any inferences we can make
without knowing the specific value of ε(A), can and should still be made. Our approach
will therefore consist in finding out what inferences can be made for a specific choice
of the ε(A), to do this for every such choice, and to then only consider those inferences
that can be made regardless of the specific choice of ε(A).
To formalize this, we consider the set R
K
>0 of all functions ε that associate a strictly
positive real ε(A)> 0 with every option set A in K. As a consequence of our interpret-
ation, we know that there is at least one ε ∈ RK>0 such that, for every A ∈ K, A− ε(A)
contains a strictly desirable option.
Let us now assume for a minute that our subject does know for which specific ε in
R
K
>0 this is the case. In order to be compatible with sd1–sd3, the resulting assessment
Kε := {A− ε(A) : A ∈ K} (9)
should then be consistent with coherence, meaning that there is at least one coherent set
of desirable option sets that includes Kε . Whenever this is the case, then as explained
in Section 3, we can use coherence to extend the assessment Kε to the unique smallest
coherent set of desirable option sets that incudes it: the natural extension Ex(Kε ) of
Kε . Based on the assessment Kε and coherence, each of the option sets in Ex(Kε ) must
necessarily contain a strictly desirable option. Hence, still assuming for the moment
that our subject knows ε , it follows that every option set in Ex(Kε) should belong to K.
Our subject may not know ε though; all we can infer from sd4 is that there must
be at least one ε for which the above is true. Let us denote this specific—but possibly
unkown—ε by ε∗. Then as argued above, for every option set A in Ex(Kε∗), it follows
from our interpretation that A should also belong to K. Since we don’t know ε∗, how-
ever, we don’t know for which option sets this is the case. What we can do though, is
to consider those option sets A ∈Q that belong to Ex(Kε) for every possible ε ∈ R
K
>0.
For those option sets, regardless of whether we know ε∗ or not, it trivially follows that
A ∈ Ex(Kε∗), and therefore, that A should belong to K. Any coherent set of desirable
option sets K that satisfies this property, we will call Archimedean.
Definition 6. A set of desirable option sets K is Archimedean if it is coherent and sat-
isfies the following property:
KA. for any A ∈Q, if A ∈ Ex(Kε ) for all ε ∈ R
K
>0, then also A ∈ K.
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Note that Archimedeanity also rules out the possibility that Kε is inconsistent for all
ε ∈ RK>0, for this would imply that K = Q, hence contradicting K1.
By replacing strong Archimedeanity with Archimedeanity, the condition that the
representing set P must be closed can be removed from Theorem 3, and we obtain a
representation in terms of general sets of lower previsions.
Theorem 4. A set of desirable option sets K is Archimedean if and only if there is some
non-empty set P ⊆ P of coherent lower previsions such that K =KP . The largest such
set P is then P(K).
The significance of this result is that it relates two very different things: sets of desirable
option sets and sets of coherent lower previsions.While this may not yet be obvious, this
is a major step in characterising choice functions of the formCP . In fact, we are nearly
there. The only thing left to do is to connect choice functions with sets of desirable
option sets. As we will explain in the next section, this connection comes quite naturally
once we interpret choice functions in terms of (strict) desirability.
6 Archimedean Choice Functions
In order to provide choice functions with an interpretation, we need to explain what
it means for an option u to be chosen from A, or alternatively, what it means for u to
be rejected from A, in the sense that u /∈ C(A). We here adopt the latter approach. In
particular, if our subject states that u /∈C(A), we take this to mean that she is convinced
that there is at least one other option v in A \{u} that is better that u, where ‘v is better
than u’ is taken to mean that v− u is strictly desirable, or equivalently, that there is
a positive price ε > 0 for which paying ε to exchange the uncertain reward u for v is
preferrable to the status quo. Note however that this interpretation does not not assume
that our subject knows the specific ε and v for which this is the case.
Our interpretation has two implications for C. First, since v− u = (v− u)− 0, it
immediately implies thatC should be translation invariant, in the sense that
u ∈C(A)⇔ 0 ∈C(A− u) for all A ∈Q and u ∈ A, (10)
with A−u := {v−u : v ∈ A}. Second, for all A ∈Q such that 0 /∈C(A∪{0}), it implies
that A should contain at least one strictly desirable gamble. Indeed, if 0 /∈C(A ∪{0}),
then according to our interpretation, there is some v ∈ (A ∪{0}) \ {0} ⊆ A such that
v− 0= v is strictly desirable. Hence, A indeed contains a strictly desirable option. For
any choice functionC, this leads us to consider the set of desirable option sets
KC :=
{
A ∈Q : 0 /∈C(A∪{0})
}
. (11)
According to our interpretation, each of the option sets in KC contains at least one
strictly desirable option. Following the discussion in Section 6, we will therefore require
KC to be Archimedean. When a choice function C satisfies both of the conditions that
are implied by our interpretation, we call it Archimedean.
Definition 7. A choice function C is Archimedean if KC is Archimedean andC is trans-
lation invariant.
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Instead of deriving a set of desirable options sets KC from a choice function C,
we can also do the converse. That is, with any set of desirable option sets K, we can
associate a choice functionCK , defined by
CK(A) :=
{
u ∈ A : A⊖ u /∈ K
}
for all A ∈Q, (12)
whereA⊖u := {v−u : v ∈A\{u}}. Similarly toKC , the expression forCK is motivated
by our interpretation. Indeed, for any option u ∈ A, the statement that A⊖u ∈ K means
that A⊖ u contains a strictly desirable option, so there is some v ∈ A \ {u} such that
v− u is strictly desirable. This is exactly our interpretation for u /∈C(A).
If a set of desirable option sets K is Archimedean, then CK will be Archimedean
as well. In fact, as our next result shows, every Archimedean choice function is of the
formCK , with K an Archimedean set of desirable option sets.
Proposition 1. Let C be a choice function. Then C is Archimedean if and only if there
is an Archimedean set of desirable option sets K such that C =CK . This set K is then
necessarily unique and furthermore equal to KC .
At this point, the hard work in characterising choice functions of the form CP is
done. Proposition 1 relates Archimedean choice functions to Archimedean sets of de-
sirable option sets, while Theorem 4 relates Archimedean sets of desirable option sets
to sets of coherent lower previsions P . Combining both results, we find that a choice
function is Archimedean if and only if it is of the formCP .
Theorem 5. A choice function C is Archimedean if and only if there is a non-empty set
P ⊆ P of coherent lower previsions such that C =CP . Whenever this is the case, the
largest such set P is P(KC).
Starting from this result, we will now proceed to axiomatise maximality and E-
admissibility, by combining Archimedeanity with additional axioms.
7 Axiomatising E-admissibility
Archimedeanity implies that a choice function is representable by a set of coherent
lower previsions P , in the sense that is of the formCP . As can be seen by comparing
Equations (4) and (2), this already brings us very close E-admissibility. Indeed, all that
we need in order to obtain E-admissibility is for the lower previsions in P to be linear.
That is, we would like the role of P(K) to be taken up by
P(K) := {P∈ P : K ⊆ KP}
instead. To achieve this, we impose a property called mixingness [3] on the Archimedean
set of desirable option sets KC that corresponds toC. For any option set A, this property
considers the set
posi(A) :=
{
n
∑
i=1
λiui : n ∈ N,λi > 0,ui ∈ A
}
,
of all positive linear combinations of the elements in A, and requires that if any of these
positive linear combinations—any mixture—is strictly desirable, then A itself should
contain a strictly desirable option as well.
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Definition 8. A set of desirable option sets K is mixing if it satisfies
KM. if B ∈ K and A ⊆ B ⊆ posi(A), then also A ∈ K, for all A,B ∈Q;
A choice function C is called mixing if KC is.
As the following result shows, mixingness achieves exactly what we need: for any
coherent set of desirable option sets K, it guarantees that the coherent lower previsions
in P(K) are in fact linear.
Proposition 2. Let K be a coherent set of desirable option sets that is mixing. Then for
any P ∈ P(K), we have that P ∈ P. Hence, P(K) = P(K).
By combining this result with Theorem 5, it follows that Archimedean choice func-
tions that are mixing correspond to E-admissibility. The next result formalizes this and
furthermore shows that the converse is true as well.
Theorem 6. A choice function C is Archimedean and mixing if and only if there is a
non-empty set P ⊆ P of linear previsions such that C =CE
P
. The largest such set P is
then P(KC).
8 Axiomatising Maximality
Having axiomatised E-admissibility, we now proceed to do the same for maximality.
The link with Archimedeanity is not that obvious here though, because there is no
immediate connection between Equations (4) and (3). Rather than focus on how to
relate these two equations, we therefore zoom in on the properties of maximality itself.
One such property, which is often used to illustrate the difference with E-admissibility,
is that a choice function that corresponds to maximality is completely determined by its
restriction to so-called binary choices—that is, choices between two options.
Definition 9. A choice function C is binary if for all A ∈Q and u ∈ A:
u ∈C(A)⇔ (∀v ∈ A \ {u}) u ∈C({u,v})
Inspired by this observation, we impose binarity as an additional axiom, alongside
Archimedeanity. As the following result shows, these two conditions are necessary and
sufficient for a choice functionC to be of the formCM
P
, hence providing an axiomatisa-
tion for decision making with maximality.
Theorem 7. A choice function C is Archimedean and binary if and only if there is a
non-empty set P ⊆ P of linear previsions such that C =CM
P
. The largest such set P is
then P(KC).
The formal proof of this result is rather technical, but the basic idea behind the
sufficiency proof is nevertheless quite intuitive. First, for every u ∈ C(A), the binarity
of C implies that u ∈ C({u,v}) for every v ∈ A \ {u}. For every such v ∈ A \ {u},
since C is Archimedean, Theorem 5 furthermore implies that there is a coherent lower
prevision P such that P(v− u) ≤ 0. Because of Theorem 1, this in turn implies that
there is a linear prevision such that P(v− u) ≤ 0 and therefore also P(u) ≥ P(v). The
challenging part consists in showing that P∈ P(KC) and establishing necessity.
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9 An Axiomatisation for Maximising Expected Utility
As we have seen in Sections 7 and 8, mixingness and binarity have quite a different
effect on Archimedean choice functions. The former implies that they correspond to
E-admissibility, while the latter leads to maximality. What is intriguing though is that
the set of linear previsionsP is twice the same. Indeed, as can be seen from Theorem 6
and 7, we may assume without loss of generality that this set is equal to P(KC). For a
choice functionC that is mixing and binary, we therefore find thatC =CE
P
=CM
P
, with
P = P(KC). As the following result shows, this is only possible if P is a singleton.
Proposition 3. Let P ⊆ P be a non-empty set of linear previsions. Then CE
P
=CM
P
if
and only if P = {P} consists of a single linear prevision P ∈ P.
As a fairly immediate consequence, we obtain the following axiomatic character-
isation of choice functions that correspond to maximising expected utility.
Theorem 8. A choice functionC is Archimedean, binary and mixing if and only if there
is a linear prevision P∈ P such that C =CP.
10 Conclusion and Future Work
The main conclusion of this work is that choice functions, when interpreted in terms
of (strict) desirability, can provide an axiomatic basis for decision making with sets
of probability models. In particular, we were able to derive necessary and sufficient
conditions for a choice function to correspond to either E-admissibility or maximality.
As a byproduct, we also obtained a characterisation for choice functions that correspond
to maximising expected utility.
The key concept on which these results were based is that of an Archimedean choice
function, where Archimedeanity is itself a combination of several conditions. The first
of these conditions is translation invariance; this condition is fairly simple and allows
for a reduction from choice functions to sets of desirable option sets. The resulting set
of desirable option sets should then satisfy two more conditions: coherence and KA.
Coherence is also fairly simple, because it follows directly from the principles of de-
sirability. The condition KA, however, is more involved, making it perhaps the least
intuitive component of Archimedeanity.
The abstract character of KA is not intrinsic to the property itself though, but rather
to the framework on which it is imposed. In fact, the basic principle sd4 on which KA
is based is very simple: if u is strictly desirable, then there must be some positive real
ε such that u− ε is strictly desirable as well. The reason why this simplicity does not
translate to KA is because we restrict attention to option sets that are finite. Consider for
example an assessment of the form {u} ∈ K. This means that u is strictly desirable and
therefore implies, due to sd4, that the option set {u− ε : ε ∈ R>0} contains at least one
strictly desirable option. Hence, we should simply impose that this set belongs to K.
This is not possible though because {u− ε : ε ∈ R>0} is infinite, while our framework
of sets of desirable option sets only considers finite option sets.
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This situation can be remedied, and the axiom of Archimedeanity can be simplified,
by developing and adopting a framework of sets of desirable options that allows for
infinite option sets, and connecting it to a theory of choice funtions that chooses from
possibly infinite option sets. Explaining how this works is beyond the scope and size of
the present contribution though; I intend to report on those results elsewhere.
Acknowlegements. This work was funded by the BOF starting grant 01N04819 and is
part of a larger research line on choice functions of Gert de Cooman and I [2,3]. Within
this line of research, this contribution is one of two parallel papers on Archimedean
choice functions, one by each of us. My paper—this one—deals with the case where
options are bounded real-valued functions. It axiomatises Archimedean choice func-
tions from the ground up by starting from (strict) desirability principles and proves
that the resulting axioms guarantee a representation in terms of coherent lower previ-
sion. The paper of Gert [4] defines Archimedeanity directly in terms of coherent lower
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A Proofs and Intermediate Results
The defining properties LP1–LP3 of a coherent lower prevision imply various additional
properties as well [12, Section 2.6.1]; we will need the following two in our proofs:
LP4. P(µ) = µ for all constant options µ ∈ R;
LP5. P(u+ µ) = P(u)+ µ for all µ ∈ R and u ∈L .
With any coherent lower prevision P, we can also associate a corresponding coher-
ent upper prevision P, defined by
P(u) :=−P(−u) for all u ∈L .
Linear previsions are lower previsions for which P and P coincide.
Proposition 4. [12, Section 2.3.6] A coherent lower prevision P on L is a linear pre-
vision if and only P(u) = P(u) for all u ∈L .
Lemma 1. For any P ∈ P, KP is coherent.
Proof. K0 and K1 hold because P(0) = 0 due to LP4. K2 holds because for any u ∈L
with infu > 0, P(u) ≥ infu > 0 due to LP1. Since K4 holds trivially, it remains to
proveK3. So consider any A1,A2 ∈KP and, for all u ∈A1 and v ∈A2, some (λu,v ,µu,v)>
0. Since A1 ∈ KP , there is some u
∗ ∈ A1 such that P(u
∗) > 0. Similarly, there is some
v∗ ∈ A2 such that P(v
∗)> 0. It therefore follows from LP3 and LP2 that
P(λu∗,v∗u
∗+ µu∗,v∗v
∗)≥ λu∗,v∗P(u
∗)+ µu∗,v∗P(v
∗)> 0,
implying that
{λu,vu+ µu,vv : u ∈ A1,v ∈ A2} ∈ KP .
⊓⊔
Proposition 5. Let K be an Archimedean set of desirable option sets. Then for any
option set A ∈Q such that A /∈ K, there is a coherent lower prevision P ∈ P(K) such
that A /∈ KP .
Proof. Let K be an Archimedean set of desirable option sets and consider any option
set A ∈Q such that A /∈ K.
Since K is Archimedean, we know from Definition 6 that there is some ε ∈ RK>0
such that A /∈ Ex(Kε). Because of Equation (6), this in turn implies that there must be
some coherent set of desirable options D ∈ D such that A /∈ KD and Kε ⊆ KD . For this
coherent set of desirable options, we now consider the corresponding coherent lower
prevision P, defined by
P(u) := sup{µ ∈R : u− µ ∈ D} for all u ∈L . (13)
That this functional P is indeed a coherent lower prevision is a standard result and
follows easily from the coherence of D; see for example [12, Section 2.3.3]. It remains
to show that A /∈ KP and K ⊆ KP .
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First assume ex absurdo that A ∈ KP . It then follows from Equation (7) that there is
an option u ∈ A such that P(u)> 0. Because of Equation (13), this implies that there is
some real µ > 0 such that u−µ ∈D. Since µ > 0 and D2 imply that µ ∈D, it therefore
follows from D3 that u = (u− µ)+ µ ∈ D. Since u ∈ A, this allows us to infer from
Equation (5) that A ∈ KD , a contradiction. Hence, it follows that A /∈ KP .
Finally, to show that K ⊆ KP , we consider any B ∈ K and prove that B ∈ KP . Con-
sider any u ∈ A. Since B ∈ K, it follows from Equation (9) that B− ε(B) ∈ Kε . Since
Kε ⊆ KD , this implies that B− ε(B) ∈ KD . It therefore follows from Equation (5) that
there is some v ∈ B− ε(B) such that v ∈ D, or equivalently, some u ∈ B such that
u− ε(B) ∈ D. Since ε(B) > 0, it therefore follows from Equation (13) that P(u) > 0.
Since u ∈ B, we infer from Equation (7) that B ∈ KP . ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 4. For the ‘only if’ part of the statement, we assume that K ∈K is an
Archimedean set of desirable option sets.
For any A ∈Q such that A /∈K, we know from Proposition 5 that there is some PA ∈
P(K) such that A /∈ KPA . Since {0} /∈ K due to K1, this implies that P(K) is non-empty
because it contains P{0}. Furthermore, since A /∈ KPA for every A /∈ K, with PA ∈ P(K),
we also know that A /∈
⋂
{KP : P ∈ P(K)} = KP(K) for every A /∈ K, and therefore, that
KP(K) ⊆ K. Since it follows from the definition of P(K) that also K ⊆ KP(K), we find
that K = KP(K). Since P(K) ⊆ P is non-empty, it follows that the ‘only if’ part of the
statement holds for P = P(K).
For the ‘if’ part of the statement, we consider any non-empty set P ⊆ P of coherent
lower previsions such that K = KP . Since KP =
⋂
{KP : P ∈P}, it then follows that
K ⊆ KP for all P ∈P , implying that P is a subset of P(K). Hence, the largest such set
P is indeed P(K). It remains to show that for any such setP , K=KP is Archimedean,
which is what we now set out to do.
We know from Lemma 1 that KP is coherent for every P ∈ P . Since K = KP =⋂
{KP : P ∈P} andP is non-empty, and because coherence is clearly preserved under
taking non-empty intersections, it follows that K coherent. According to Definition 6,
the Archimedeanity of K therefore hinges on whether or not it satisfies KA. We will
show that it indeed satisfies this property. To that end, consider any A ∈ Q such that
A ∈ Ex(Kε ) for all ε ∈ R
K
>0. We need to prove that A ∈ K.
Consider any P ∈P and any B ∈ K = KP ⊆ KP . It then follows from Equation (7)
that there is some u ∈ B such that P(u) > 0. Let ε∗(B) := P(u)/2 > 0. It then follows
from LP5 that P(u− ε
∗(B)) = P(u)− ε∗(B) = P(u)/2 > 0, which, since u ∈ B, implies
that B− ε∗(B) ∈ KP . Since this is true for every B ∈ K, we have found some ε
∗ ∈RK>0
such that Kε∗ ⊆ KP . Hence, since KP is coherent because of Lemma 1, it follows from
Equation (6) that Ex(Kε∗)⊆ KP . Since by assumption, A ∈ Ex(Kε ) for all ε ∈ R
K
>0, we
therefore have in particular that A ∈ Ex(Kε∗)⊆ KP . Since this is true for every P ∈P ,
we conclude that A ∈
⋂
{KP : P ∈P}= KP = K. ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 1. First assume that C is an Archimedean choice function, mean-
ing that KC is Archimedean and C is translation invariant. Consider the Archimedean
set of desirable option sets K = KC. For any A ∈Q and u ∈ A, we then find that
u ∈CK(A)⇔ A⊖ u /∈ K⇔ A⊖ u /∈ KC ⇔ 0 ∈C
(
(A⊖ u)∪{0}
)
⇔ 0 ∈C(A− u)⇔ u ∈C(A),
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using Equation (11) for the first equivalence, Equation (12) for the third one, and trans-
lation invariance—Equation (10)—for the last. Hence,C =CK .
Next, consider any Archimedean set of desirable option sets K such that C = CK .
First observe thatCK is translation invariant because, for all A ∈Q and u ∈ A,
u ∈CK(A)⇔ A⊖ u /∈ K⇔ (A− u)⊖ 0 /∈ K⇔ 0 ∈CK(A− u),
using Equation (12) for the first and third equivalence. Next, observe that for all A ∈Q
A ∈ KC ⇔ 0 /∈C(A∪{0})
⇔ 0 /∈CK(A∪{0})⇔ (A∪{0})⊖ 0∈ K⇔ A \ {0} ∈ K⇔ A ∈ K,
using Equation (11) for the first equivalence, Equation (12) for the third equivalence
and K0 and K4 for the fifth one. This implies that K = KC , thereby implying that
K is unique and equal to KC . Since K is Archimedean, this also implies that KC is
Archimedean and therefore, since we already know that C is translation invariant, that
C is Archimedean. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 5. First assume thatC is Archimedean. It then follows from Proposi-
tion 1 thatC=CK for the Archimedean set of desirable option sets K =KC . Since KC is
Archimedean, it furthermore follows from Theorem 4 that KC =KP , with P = P(KC).
Hence, we find thatC =CK =CKC =CKP , which is equal to CP because
CKP (A) = {u ∈ A : A⊖ u /∈ KP}
=
{
u ∈ A : (∃P ∈P)A⊖ u /∈ KP
}
=
{
u ∈ A : (∃P ∈P)(∀v ∈ A \ {u})P(v− u)≤ 0
}
=CP(A) for all A ∈Q.
Conversely, consider any non-empty set P ⊆ P of coherent lower previsions such that
C =CP . It then follows from the derivation above that C =CKP and from Theorem 4
that KP is Archimedean. Proposition 1 therefore implies thatC is Archimedean.
It remains to show that P ⊆ P(KC). To that end, consider any P ∈ P and any
A ∈KC . Since A ∈KC , we know that 0 /∈C(A∪{0}). SinceC=CP , it therefore follows
from Equation (4) that there is some v ∈ (A∪{0})\{0} such that 0< P(v−0) = P(v).
Since (A ∪ {0})\ {0} = A \ {0} ⊆ A, this implies that there is some v ∈ A such that
P(v)> 0, meaning that A ∈ KP . Since A ∈ KC was arbitrary, this implies that KC ⊆ KP ,
hence P ∈ P(KC). Since P ∈ P was arbitrary, we find that P is indeed a subset of
P(KC). ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider any P ∈ P(K) and assume ex absurdo that P /∈ P. It
then follows from Proposition 4 that there is some u ∈ L such that P(u) 6= P(u), or
equivalently, such that P(u)+P(−u) 6= 0. Since we know from LP4 and LP3 that
0= P(0) = P(u− u)≥ P(u)+P(−u),
this implies that P(u) +P(−u) < 0. Let ε := −P(u)−P(−u) > 0 and define u1 :=
u−P(u)− ε/2 and u2 :=−u+P(u)+ε . Then on the one hand, it follows from LP5 that
P(u1) = P(u−P(u)− ε/2) = P(u)−P(u)− ε/2 =−ε/2< 0
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and
P(u2) = P(−u+P(u)+ ε) = P(−u)+P(u)+ ε = 0,
so {u1,u2} /∈ KP and therefore, since K ⊆ KP , also {u1,u2} /∈ K. On the other hand,
however, since u1+u2 = ε/2> 0, it follows from the coherence of K—and K2 and K4 in
particular—that {u1,u2,u1+u2}∈K. Since {u1,u2}⊆ {u1,u2,u1+u2}⊆ posi({u1,u2}),
this contradicts the mixingness of K. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 6. First assume thatC is Archimedean and mixing. This implies that
the set of desirable option sets KC is Archimedean (and hence also coherent) and
mixing, and therefore, it follows from Proposition 2 that P(KC) = P(KC). Since C is
Archimedean, it furthermore follows from Theorem 5 thatC=CP , with P = P(KC) =
P(KC) non-empty. For every A ∈Q, this implies that
CP(A) =
{
u ∈ A : (∃P∈P)(∀v ∈ A \ {u}) P(v− u)≤ 0
}
=
{
u ∈ A : (∃P∈P)(∀v ∈ A \ {u}) P(u)≥ P(v)
}
=CEP (A), (14)
where the crucial second equality holds because the elements of P = P(KC) are linear
previsions. Hence,C =CE
P
.
Consider now any non-empty set P ⊆ P of linear previsions such that C =CE
P
. It
then follows from Equation (14) that C = CE
P
= CP . Since P ⊆ P ⊆ P, it therefore
follows from Theorem 5 thatC is Archimedean. To show that it is mixing, we consider
any A,B ∈Q such that B ∈ KC and A ⊆ B ⊆ posi(A). We need to prove that then also
A ∈KC . Since B ∈KC , we know that 0 /∈C(B∪{0}) =C
E
P
(B∪{0}). Consider now any
P∈P . It then follows from Equation (2) that there is some v ∈ (B∪{0})\{0}=B\{0}
such that P(v) > P(0) = 0, using LP4 for the last equality. Since v ∈ B \ {0} ⊆ B ⊆
posi(A), we know that v = ∑ni=1 λiui, with n ∈ N and, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, λi > 0
and ui ∈ A. Since P is linear and P(v)> 0, this implies that ∑
n
i=1 λiP(ui)> 0. Since the
coefficients λi are all strictly positive, this implies that there must be some k∈ {1, . . . ,n}
such that P(uk)> 0 = P(0). Since uk ∈ A, this implies that we have found some u ∈ A
such that P(u) > 0. Since P(0) = 0, we also know that u 6= 0. Hence, u ∈ A \ {0} =
(A ∪ {0}) \ {0} and P(u) > 0 = P(0). Since we can repeat this argument for every
P∈P , we infer from Equation (2) that 0 /∈CE
P
(A∪{0})=C(A∪{0}). Hence, A ∈KC ,
as desired.
It remains to show thatP ⊆P(KC). On the one hand, sinceC=CP andP ⊆P⊆P,
we know from Theorem 5 that P ⊆ P(KC). On the other hand, sinceC is Archimedean
and mixing, we know that KC is Archimedean (and hence coherent) and mixing, so
Proposition 2 tells us that P(KC) = P(KC). Hence, we find that P ⊆ P(KC) = P(KC).
⊓⊔
Proposition 6. Let K be an Archimedean set of desirable option sets and consider any
u ∈L . Then {u} /∈ K if and only if there is some P∈ P(K) such that {u} /∈ KP.
Proof. First assume that {u} /∈ K. Since K is Archimedean, it then follows from Pro-
position 5 that there is a coherent lower prevision P ∈ P(K) such that {u} /∈ KP , mean-
ing that P(u) ≤ 0. Because of Theorem 1, this implies that there is some P∈ P such
that P(u) = P(u) ≤ 0 and, for all v ∈ L , P(v) ≥ P(v). Since P(u) ≤ 0, we see that
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{u} /∈ KP. To establish the ‘only if’ part of the statement, it therefore remains to prove
that P ∈ P(K), or equivalently, that K ⊆ KP. To that end, consider any A ∈ K. Since
P ∈ P(K), we know that K ⊆KP and therefore, that A ∈ KP , meaning that there is some
v ∈ A such that P(v) > 0. Since P(v) ≥ P(v), this implies that P(v) > 0. Hence, since
v ∈ A, we find that A ∈ KP. Since A ∈ K was arbitrary, it follows that K ⊆ KP.
For the ‘if’ part of the statement, assume that there is some P∈P(K) such that {u} /∈
KP. Since K is Archimedean, it follows from Theorem 4 that K = KP =
⋂
{KP : P ∈
P}, with P = P(K). Since P∈ P(K) ⊆ P(K) = P and {u} /∈ KP, this implies that
{u} /∈ K. ⊓⊔
Proof of Theorem 7. First assume that C is Archimedean and binary. Since we know
that C is Archimedean, it follows from Proposition 1 that C =CK for the Archimedean
(and hence coherent) set of desirable option sets K = KC . For any u,v ∈ L such that
u 6= v, this implies that
u ∈C({u,v})⇔ u ∈CK({u,v})⇔{v− u}= {u,v}⊖{u} /∈ K = KC
⇔ (∃P∈ P(KC)){v− u} /∈ KP
⇔ (∃P∈ P(KC))P(v− u)≤ 0
⇔ (∃P∈ P(KC))P(u)≥ P(v),
using Proposition 6 for the third equivalence. SinceC is binary, this implies that
C(A) =
{
u ∈ A : (∀v ∈ A \ {u}) u ∈C({u,v})
}
=
{
u ∈ A : (∀v ∈ A \ {u})(∃P∈ P(KC))P(u)≥ P(v)
}
=CMP(KC)(A)
for all A ∈Q. Hence, C =CM
P
, with P = P(KC). To see why P(KC) is non-empty, it
suffices to note that {0} /∈ KC because of K1 and the fact that KC is coherent. Indeed, it
then follows from Proposition 6 that there is some P∈ P(KC) such that {0} /∈ KP, which
implies that P(KC) is non-empty.
Consider now any non-empty set P ⊆ P of linear previsions such thatC=CM
P
. For
all A ∈Q and u ∈ A, it then follows from Equation (3) that
u ∈C(A)⇔ u ∈CMP(A)⇔ (∀v ∈ A \ {u})(∃P∈P)P(u)≥ P(v)
⇔ (∀v ∈ A \ {u}) u ∈CMP({u,v})
⇔ (∀v ∈ A \ {u}) u ∈C({u,v}).
Hence,C is binary. To show that it is also Archimedean, we consider the set
P
∗ :=
{ n
min
i=1
Pi : n ∈N,(∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,n})Pi ∈P
}
of all minima of a finite number of linear previsions in P , which is clearly non-empty
becauseP is. Due to Theorem 1, we also know that P∗⊆ P. We will show thatCP∗ =
CM
P
. This implies that C =CM
P
=CP∗ and therefore, because of Theorem 5, that C is
Archimedean.
Consider any A ∈Q and any u ∈ A. First assume that u ∈CP∗(A). This means that
there is some P ∈P∗ such that, for all v ∈ A \ {u}, P(v− u)≤ 0. For all v ∈ A \ {u},
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since P ∈P∗, this implies that there is some P∈P such that P(v−u) = P(v−u)≤ 0
and therefore also P(u)≥P(v). Hence, u ∈CM
P
(A). Conversely, assume that u ∈CM
P
(A).
For all v ∈ A \ {u}, this implies that there is some Pv ∈P such that Pv(u)≥ Pv(v) and
therefore Pv(v−u)≤ 0. Let P =minv∈A\{u}Pv . Then P ∈P
∗ because A \{u} is finite
and, for all v ∈ A \ {u}, P(v− u) ≤ Pv(v− u)≤ 0. Hence, u ∈ CP∗(A). We conclude
that u ∈ CP∗(A) if and only if u ∈ C
M
P
(A). Since A ∈Q and u ∈ A are arbitrary, this
implies that, indeed,CP∗ =C
M
P
.
It remains to show that P ⊆ P(KC). To that end, consider any P ∈ P and any
A ∈KC . Since A ∈KC , we know that 0 /∈C(A∪{0}). SinceC=C
M
P
, it therefore follows
fromEquation (3) that there is some v ∈ (A∪{0})\{0} such that 0=P(0)<P(v). Since
(A∪{0})\{0}= A \{0}⊆ A, this implies that there is some v ∈ A such that P(v)> 0,
meaning that A ∈ KP. Since A ∈ KC was arbitrary, this implies that KC ⊆ KP, hence
P∈ P(KC). Since P∈P was arbitrary, we find that P is indeed a subset of P(KC). ⊓⊔
Proof of Proposition 3. First assume thatCE
P
=CM
P
. Consider any two P1,P2 ∈P and
assume ex absurdo that P1 6=P2. This implies that there is some u ∈L such that P1(u) 6=
P2(u). Without loss of generality, we can assume that P1(u)> P2(u) (otherwise, it suf-
fices to reverse the role of P1 and P2). Let u1 := P1(u)−u and u2 := u−P2(u) and con-
sider the set A := {0,u1,u2}. It then follows from LP5 that P1(u2) = P1(u)−P2(u)> 0,
P2(u1) = P1(u)−P2(u) > 0 and from LP4 that P1(0) = P2(0) = 0. Hence, u1 6= 0 and
u2 6= 0, so A \ {0} = {u1,u2}. LP5 and LP4 also imply that P1(u1) = 0 = P1(0) and
P2(u2) = 0 = P2(0). Since P1,P2 ∈ P , it therefore follows from Equation (3) that
0 ∈ CM
P
(A). Since CE
P
= CM
P
, this implies that 0 ∈ CE
P
(A), and therefore, because
of Equation (2), that there is some P ∈ P such that, for all v ∈ A \ {0} = {u1,u2},
P(0)≥ P(v). Due to the linearity of P and LP4, this implies that
P(u1+ u2) = P(u1)+P(u2)≤ P(0)+P(0) = 0+ 0= 0.
However, since u1+u2 = P1(u)−u+u−P2(u) = P1(u)−P2(u), LP4 also implies that
P(u1+ u2) = P
(
P1(u)−P2(u)
)
= P1(u)−P2(u)> 0,
a contradiction. Hence, it must be that P1 = P2. Since this is true for any two P1,P2 ∈P ,
and since P is non-empty, this implies that P consists of a single linear prevision
P∈ P: P = {P}.
Next, assume that there is a linear previsionP∈P such thatP = {P}. It then follows
directly from Equation (2) and (3) thatCE
P
=CM
P
.
Proof of Theorem 8. First assume thatC is Archimedean, binary and mixing. Let P =
P(KC). SinceC is Archimedean and binary, it follows from Theorem 7 thatC=C
M
P
and
that P is non-empty. Since C is Archimedean and mixing, it follows from Theorem 6
that C =CE
P
. Hence, CE
P
=CM
P
. Since P is non-empty, it therefore follows from Pro-
position 3 that there is a unique linear prevision P∈P such thatP = {P}. Equations (1)
and (2) now imply that C =CE
P
=CP.
Next, consider a linear prevision P∈ P and let C =CP. Consider the set P = {P}.
On the one hand, it then follows from Equations (1) and (2) that C = CP = C
E
P
and
therefore, because of Theorem 6, thatC is Archimedean and mixing. On the other hand,
it follows from Equations (1) and (3) that C = CP = C
M
P
and therefore, because of
Theorem 7, thatC is binary.
